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THE FREEDOM OF CIVILIANS OF 
ENEMY NATIONALITY TO DEPART FROM 
TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY A HOSTILE 
BELLIGERENT* 
by Dr. Walter L. Williams, Jr.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The progressive development of international law pertaining to 
protection of civilians in armed conflict continues to be a matter of 
signficant interest to military lawyers and legal scholars. This arti-
cle addresses an important aspect of that subject, the freedom of 
civilians of enemy nationality to depart from territory controlled by 
a hostile belligerent. Neither diplomatic discourse nor legal litera-
ture has focused on this topic in recent times. However, terminating 
hostile belligerent control over civilians at the earliest practicable 
time has always been highly relevant to the humanitarian objective 
of protecting civilians in time of war. This is increasingly so in the 
context of modern armed conflict. In dealing with this quite substan-
tial topic, this article assuredly does not present a full appraisal of 
the many questions involved. The discussion offers an impressionis-
tic, exploratory inquiry only into certain issues and encourages 
future dialogue and contribution in developing definitive analysis 
useful both for governmental advisors and legal scholars. In keeping 
with the aims of the law pertaining to protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, the observational perspective is that of a citizen of the world 
community recommending to decision-makers policies reflecting 
community aspirations and appropriate rules calculated to more 
effectively implement those policies. 
*The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School, the Depart-
ment of the Army, or any other governmental entity. 
**Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., M.A., LL.B., University of Southern California; 
LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University. Lieutenant Colonel, the Judge Advocate General's 
Corps, United States Army Reserve. 
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The methodology1 underlying this presentation emphasizes three 
aspects. The first is a requirement for comprehensive factual analy-
sis of any particular instance of armed conflict. This analysis is 
contextual, viewing that conflict within the context of the existing 
global process of power in which states interact by various strategies 
to secure and maintain effective power positions in their relations. 
The second aspect is trend analysis of the course of legal decision 
concerning the right of civilians of enemy nationality to depart from 
territory controlled by a hostile belligerent. This is an analysis that, 
as regards past trends, properly considers the present and future 
effects of new conditions pertinent to the conduct of modern armed 
conflicts. The third aspect is a policy-oriented analysis of trends of 
legal decision, an appraisal of trends in light of advocated world 
community policies seeking the maximum protection of enemy civ-
ilians in modern armed conflicts. It is suggested that only through 
such a methodology may one expect accurately to determine the 
present developments in the rules pertaining to the freedom of 
movement of enemy civilians, to project those developments into the 
future, and to appraise the consequences of those developments. 
II. THE CONTEXT OF MODERN ARMED 
CONFLICT: INCREASED RISKS TO ENEMY 
CIVILIANS 
A. INCREASING RESORT TO ARMED FORCE 
In addressing the subject of the freedom of enemy civilians to 
depart from territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, the first 
proposition is that, unfortunately, the foreseeable trend in interna-
tional relations suggests that armed conflict situations placing civ-
ilians in grave risk will occur with increasing frequency. The trend 
over the last twenty years has been one of steady erosion of legal 
constraints on the use of armed force in international relations. 
Increasingly, prohibitions embodied in the United Nations Charter, 
other conventions, and customary international law receive lip serv-
ice or are ignored. United Nations Security Council decisions and 
orders rendered under supposedly controlling authority of Chapter 
1A concise discussion of the methodology used in this article is presented in 
McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a 
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188 (1963), and McDougal, Jurispru-
dence for a Free Society, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1966). Detailed application of this approach is 
illustrated in M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: 
The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961). European readers will find a 
discussion in McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary 
Conception, 82 Hague Recueil des Cours 137 (1953). 
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Seven of the Charter frequently are viewed, at best, as recommenda-
tions or else are simply disregarded or even derided by some states. 
Despite the lessons of two world wars and bloody regional and bina-
tional struggles of this century, many states today seem bent on 
"national tribalism", enthusastically bashing their neighbors with 
modern "war clubs" of sophisticated weaponry. To paraphrase the 
Irish poet Yeats, the "center" simply is not holding. To chart even the 
more salient points of this trend or to analyze the various explanatory 
factors is beyond the scope of this discussion. It is merely noted that 
this increasing trend to resort to unilateral use of armed force for 
both aggressive and defensive objectives occurs in the context of 
continued absence throughout the world community of the will to 
establish strong global and regional community agencies possessing 
the authority and the means to deter or to terminate impermissible 
uses of armed force in international relations. The bloody war 
between Iran and Iraq, the "serial" conflicts in Arab-Israeli rela-
tions, tragically evidenced recently in Lebanon, the spreading pat-
tern of transborder violence in Central America, the recent 
Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands, and the continuing 
Soviet violence in Afghanistan are merely more notorious instances 
of this trend. This is already a bleak picture, but it is suggested that 
this is merely the early stage of a still more precipitous descent of 
much of the world down the deadly slope of death and destruction 
resulting from modern armed conflict. 
Consequently, the increasing number of instances of armed con-
flict necessarily will subject great numbers of civilians to risks of 
death, injury, and other deprivations. Thus, the maximum develop-
ment of and adherence to the rules of armed conflict pertaining to 
protection of civilians, including the principle of freedom of enemy 
civilians to depart from territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, 
become every more compelling. 
B. SPECIFIC ADVERSE FACTORS IN MODERN 
ARMED CONFLICTS 
Concurrently, as the tragic increase in international armed con-
flict brings grave risks to larger numbers of civilians, certain fea-
tures of present and future conflicts suggest that the intensity of 
those risks likewise will increase. Briefly and with primary focus on 
enemy civilians present in territory controlled by a hostile belliger-
ent, some of those adverse factors will be discussed. 
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1. Development in Modern Weaponry and the Problem of Movement 
Within Territory Controlled by a Hostile Belligerent 
a. Development in Modern Weaponry 
One important factor is the dynamic developments in military 
weaponry. With the enormously increased destructive range and 
speed of modern weapon systems, the risks to civilians in or in the 
proximity of target areas have increased enormously. Even if suffi-
cient time exists to relocate civilians, and time often will be insuffi-
cient, the security of rear areas of combat zones or other locations 
may be most illusory. The fluidity of modern combat and the conse-
quences of human or mechanical error in use of weapon systems may 
substantially endanger civilians relocated to supposedly safer areas. 
Especially for smaller states, the entirety of national territory may 
constitute one large combat zone. 
b. Movement Within Territory Controlled by a Hostile Belligerent 
With this expectation that civilians will encounter increasing dif-
ficulty in avoiding damage from modern military weaponry, the 
extent to which the humanitarian law of armed conflict requires 
hostile belligerents to relocate enemy civilians to safer areas or to 
permit them to move to safer areas should be examined. In apprais-
ing the situation of enemy civilians present in territory controlled by 
a hostile belligerent, two categories are considered: those who are in 
the hostile belligerent's own territory and those in territory occupied 
by the hostile belligerent. As regards the first group, the 1949 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War2 ("Civilian Convention") presently offers meager legal 
protection from exposure to modern weaponry. If a hostile belliger-
ent has refused to permit enemy civilians to depart from its territory, 
the Civilian Convention does not require the Detaining Power to 
relocate those civilians to a particularly safe location. As regards 
internees, enemy civilians held under close custody of the Detaining 
Power, the duty of the Detaining Power is merely to avoid the place-
ment internment camps in areas "particularly exposed to the 
dangers of war."3 The difference between the negative duty not to set 
up an internment camp in close proximity to a military target and 
the affirmative duty to place internees in a particularly safe location, 
such as many miles from the anticipated zone of conflict, is self-
evident. As regards enemy civilians not interned but still not allowed 
to depart from the belligerent's territory, the Civilian Convention 
26 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (12 Aug. 1949). 
3Civilian Convention, Art. 83. 
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provides no duty of safe location whatsoever beyond "national treat-
ment." If enemy civilians reside in an area "particularly exposed" to 
the dangers of war, they have the right to move from that area "to the 
same extent as the nationals of the States concerned."4 Thus, if the 
hostile belligerent prevents its own nationals from moving, enemy 
civilians have no right to move. Although not free to depart the 
belligerent's territory if they wish, enemy civilians can be forced to 
accept exactly the same extent of risks as the national populace. 
Furthermore, from the wording of the Convention, enemy nationals 
in areas not "particularly exposed" but in which there was some 
reasonable risk from the conflict would seem to have not even the 
;right to "national treatment." Thus, the hostile belligerent's nation-
als in an area not so endangered as to be "particularly" exposed to 
risk might be quite free to move elsewhere, while, for avowed control 
purposes, the belligerent lawfully could require enemy civilians to 
remain. 
The Civilian Convention does prohibit using protected persons to 
render points or areas immune from military operations.5 That duty, 
however, concerns moving civilians to the location of military or 
establishing activities that are military targets where civilians are 
present in an attempt to make military targets immune from attack. 
This is in line with the idea of not actively placing civilians, including 
enemy civilians, in a place "particulary exposed" to risk. In the 
Civilian Convention, the reference to establishing "safety zones," 
which applies for enemy and non-enemy civilians and in either a 
belligerent's own territory or in occupied territory, is permissive, not 
obligatory. Further, the provision covers categories of persons more 
susceptible of injury. Thus, belligerents may establish "hospital and 
safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from the effects 
of war, wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, 
expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven."6 As 
regards enemy civilians in occupied territory, the Occupying Power 
again has the duty of not using protected persons to render points or 
areas immune from military operations.7 However, the Civilian 
Convention does not appear to create an affirmative duty to relocate 
enemy civilians even if they are endangered greatly by the continued 
conflict and circumstances of the Occupying Power's military secur-
ity to make relocation feasible as long as the Occupying Power has 
not established military activities in close proximity of civilians. 
4ld. at Art. 38(4). 
5ld. at Art. 28. 
6ld. at Art. 14. 
7/d. at Art. 28. 
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Article 49, in permissive, not obligatory, language provides that the 
Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a 
given area "if the security of the population or imperative military 
reasons so demand." This right of the Occupying Power, rather than 
a duty, is set forth as an exception from a general duty not to engage 
in individual or mass forcible transfers in occupied territory.s Arti-
cle 49 does give enemy civilians the right to move from an area 
"particularly exposed to the dangers of war" by prohibiting the 
Occupying Power from detaining them in such areas. That right is 
limited, however, by authorizing the Occupying Power to detain 'the 
enemy civilians if the "security of the population" or "imperative 
military reasons so demand." As regards "security of population", 
the purpose of the restrictive clause is to avoid the risk to the popu-
lace that could result if enemy civilians or other protected persons 
were to seek to move en mass with no safety controls or in conditions 
of immediate armed conflict.9 To justify prevention of movement on 
grounds of military reasons, the need must be imperative, such as 
significant hindrance to important military operations, not merely a 
matter of military convenience to the Occupying Power. Thus, 
although the Occupying Power has no general affirmative duty to 
relocate enemy civilians to a safer location, those civilians do have the 
individual right to choose to move to a safer location, albeit circum-
scribed by exceptions that, in situations of some civilian safety risk or 
military difficulty, could be applied by the Occupying Power with 
little expectation of successful challenge for abuse of discretion. 
In summary, the development of modern military armament 
increasingly will subject enemy civilians in territory controlled by a 
hostile belligerent to much greater risks than in the past, despite the 
best of reasonable, good faith efforts of a hostile belligerent to place 
them in positions of sure safety. However, in contrast to this scenario 
of increasing risk, the current law of protection of enemy civilians 
does not obligate the hostile belligerent to make that effort, either in 
its own territory or in occupied territory. In the belligerent's own 
territory, the law creates only a highly limited obligation to allow the 
enemy civilians to exercise individual choice to move to a safer zone. 
8Pictet's Commentary described the Occupying Power as having both the right and 
duty of evacuation of inhabitants to places of refuge. However, this assertion is made 
in the context ofthe inhabitants being endangered as the result of military operations. 
J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War 280 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Pictet]. This situation 
causes Article 28 to apply, with its duty of evacuation. Where military operations of 
the Occupying Power have not placed the inhabitants in danger, Article 49 expresses 
only a right of the Occupying Power to require evacuation. 
9Pictet, supra note 8, at 283. 
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c. Scarcity of Resources to Support Enemy Civilians 
A second adverse factor to consider in the context of the trend in 
modern armed conflicts is that the Civilian Convention envisions the 
possibility of substantial resources being committed to the mainte-
nance of enemy civilians. In the hostile belligerent's own territory, 
the Convention entitles interned civilians, inter alia, to adequate 
shelter, clothing, food, and medical services.10 In occupied territory, 
the Occupying Power has various support duties, including, if neces-
sary, the duties to provide adequate food and medical supplies from 
its own resources and to maintain adequate public hygiene and 
health facilities.11 Significant numbers of trained military and civil-
ian personnel specialized in various skills are required to administer 
support and control regimes concerning enemy civilians in territory 
controlled by a hostile belligerent. 
The implicit model for these requirements of substantial resource 
commitments is that of conflict between states amply endowed with 
these various resources and having them available for use in areas 
perhaps well-removed from the combat zone. However, in a world 
community overwhelmingly composed of "developing" states pos-
sessing meager quantities of these resources, the reality is that the 
belligerents, or some of them, in most of the future armed conflicts 
will possess these resources at extremely low levels even at the initial 
stages of the conflict. This scarcity will be aggravated as resource 
attrition occurs during combat. Related to the problem of safe loca-
tion for enemy civilians is the fact that, in many instances, suitable 
support facilities and personnel infrastructure may be available only 
in or near urban centers, which may contain vital military targets. 
To expect an undeveloped state in the throes of warfare to establish 
anything but the most primitive of internment facilities or to provide 
adequate resources to sustain enemy population in occupied terri-
tory when its own citizens are living in inadequate circumstances 
would be most illusory. As regards enemy civilians detained but not 
interned in a hostile belligerent's territory, Pictet tells us that, para-
doxically, in World War II: "The living conditions of enemy civilians 
who remained at liberty ... were sometimes more precarious than 
those of internees."12 The Civilian Convention requires the Detaining 
Power to provide for support of enemy civilians who are detained but 
not interned if there is a nexus between their inability to support 
themselves and the Detaining Power's control measures. Addition-
wcivilian Convention, Arts. 85, 89-91. 
UJd. at Arts. 55, 56. 
I2Pictet, supra note 8, at 249. 
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ally, enemy civilians are entitled to national treatment concerning 
employment, subject to security considerations.13 However, estab-
lishing the grounds to cause this contingnent support duty to become 
operative or to show violation of the national treatment standard for 
employment could be most difficult. Situations of extreme hardship 
could result. Ironically, Pictet noted that Article 42 of the Civilian 
Convention requires the Detaining Power to intern an enemy civilian 
who voluntarily requests internment and that the "voluntary" 
request can be based on the miserable circumstances encountered if 
not interned.14 Thus, confinement may be accepted to acquire ade-
quate support. 
d. Ideological Animosity and Attitudes Toward Enemy Civilians 
A third adverse factor bearing upon the welfare of enemy civilians 
in territory controlled by a hostile belligerent is that the presence of 
severe ideological animosity between belligerents is one of the reali-
ties of modern international armed conflict. This animosity may 
result from excessively parochial nationalism or differences in polit-
ical philosophy, race, religion, or ethnic background. Hostile atti-
tudes toward enemy civilians may exist in any conflict if for no other 
reason than the tragic losses suffered in combat. Additionally, ideo-
logical animosity or long-standing feuds based on past instances of 
conflict or felt injustice may fuel the passions of the hostile belliger-
ent's populace or military and result in excessive deprivations to 
enemy civilians. 
e. Insufficient Training and Control of the Hostile Belligerent's 
Military Forces and Civilian Population 
Finally, the risk of mistreatment of enemy civilians in many future 
conflict situations is increased by the fact that the military forces of 
many of the developing states are, unfortunately, not well trained 
and disciplined and that, in many states, there is little evidence of 
significant instruction of either the military forces or pertinent civ-
ilian groups in the law pertaining to the protection of enemy civil-
ians. Further, the governments of many states today have major 
difficulty in maintaining adequate public safety even in peacetime. 
Frequently, foreign persons are the victims of hostile actions by 
members of the populace. In crisis conditions of armed conflict, 
many belligerents may simply be unable to fulfill their obligations to 
protect enemy civilians from deprivations by either undisciplined 
military personnel or by a violent populace. Defects in "personnel 
13Civilian Convention, Art. 39. 
I4Pictet, supra note 8, at 259. 
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infrastructure", combined with ideological animosity or hatred and 
great difficulty in maintaining public order, provide a scenario for 
grave risk to enemy civilians, especially to those present in the 
belligerent's own territory. This level of risk undoubtedly would 
increase as the conflict continues. 
III. THE FREEDOM OF ENEMY CIVILIANS 
TO DEPART FROM TERRITORY CONTROLLED 
BY A HOSTILE BELLIGERENT 
Given that the process of modern international armed conflict 
generally involves substantially increased risks to enemy civilians 
present in territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, the conclusion 
follows that the freedom of enemy civilians to depart that territory 
may in some instances be essential for their protection. In any event, 
perspectives of fundamental human dignity require that, in the 
absenc!=l of very substantial, countervailing considerations, enemy 
civilians should be able to exercise freedom of choice to depart from 
hostile belligerent control. Freedom of departure is a fundamental 
aspect of freedom of personality, which is at the core of con vern in the 
humanitarian law of armed conflict. It is submitted that the Civilian 
Convention should clearly obligate a hostile belligerent to allow 
enemy civilians to depart from territory the belligerent controls as 
long as no significant detriment is suffered by that belligerent or no 
significant advantage accrues to the opposing belligerent. This view 
is consistent with the fundamental balancing principle which under-
lies the humanitarian law of armed conflict. An examination of the 
trends in the law in this area follows. 
A. FREEDOM TO DEPART FROM THE 
HOSTILE BELLIGERENT'S OWN TERRITORY 
As the highly authoritative Pictet's Commentary15 has noted, the 
legal status of enemy civilians present in a belligerent's territory has 
changed from that of slaves under Roman Law, to treatment as 
prisoners of war in the time of Grotius, to persons free to leave a 
belligerent's country under long-standing customary international 
law. Consequently, by the time of negotiation of the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907,16 the draftsmen thought the inclusion of a provision 
forbidding the prevention of enemy civilians from leaving a belliger-
ent's territory was clearly unnecessary. In Pictet's words: "They felt 
15/d. at 232. 
16Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land with Annex of Regulations, 36 Stat. 2777 (1910), T.S. No. 539 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hague Convention]. 
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it went without saying."17 However, the drafter may have had much 
more in perspective the experience of the past than the anticipation 
of the experience of the future. By the eve of World War I, the 
conception of the use in major conflicts of massive military forces 
based upon compulsory military service was well established. With 
this in mind, the practice at the onset of World War I, and even more 
so for World War II, was to detain and to intern large numbers of 
enemy civilians. Unfortunately, in that period, a widespread and 
indiscriminate restraint of enemy civilians occurred. Although the 
practices of states varied, many enemy civilians were detained and 
interned. From any reasonable perspective of military necessity, 
these detainees should have been permitted to leave the hostile bel-
ligerent's territory. Likewise, many were interned who, at the most, 
should have deplorable conditions."18 Subsequent, ad hoc instances of 
unilateral authorization to leave, or agreed exchanges, dealing with 
children, the aged, the sick, and women brought tardy relief for 
some. However, in many instances where some members of a family 
were authorized to depart, relatives chose to remain together in what 
was in effect a form of captivity, rather than separate. Unnecessary 
controls over the freedom of enemy civilians to leave a belligerent's 
territory led directly to unnecessary physical and emotional suffer-
ing, often extreme, by them and by their loved ones. 
In a preliminary "Draft Convention" prepared by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and adopted as a draft 
convention by the XVth International Conference of the ICRC in 
Tokyo in 1934,19 the ICRC sought, inter alia, to establish a regime of 
protections for detainees and internees. Further, the Draft Conven-
tion sought to limit a state's power to prevent enemy civilians from 
leaving its territory to two categories: persons who were liable to be 
mobilized in the military and persons whose departure "would 
threaten the security of the State of residence in some other way." 
With the outbreak of conflict in 1939, the Draft Convention failed to 
enter into force and enemy nationality alone often was the basis for 
detainement and internment. During the war, the ICRC was able, 
for approximately 160,000 civilians of fifty different nationalities, to 
arrange that internees be given the benefit, by analogy, of the provi-
sions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.20 
17Pictet, supra note 8, at 232. See Wilson, Treatment of Civilian Alien Enemies, 37 
Am. J. Int'l L. 32 (1943). 




1983] . CIVILIANS OF ENEMY NATIONALITY 
In 1949, the negotiators of the Civilian Convention dealt with the 
right of enemy civilians to leave belligerent territory in Article 35. 
That Article represents the present trend of decision. Article 35 
states, in part: "All protected persons who may desire to leave the 
territory at the onset of, or during, a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, 
unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the 
State."21 
As against the apparent recognition of the right of enemy civilians 
to leave a belligerent's territory, one could hardly imagine a broader 
right of discretion to prevent departure than the emphasized "lim-
itation" on the right. The term, "national interests," which in today's 
world has received the broadest possible interpretation in many 
other contexts, stands totally undefined in Article 35. Pictet's Com-
mentary asserted that "national interests" is broader than "security 
considerations," the term used in the ICRC Tokyo Draft, which the 
Diplomatic Conference negotiating the Civilian Convention had 
rejected.22 The Commentary noted, for example, that endangerment 
to the national economy would fall within the meaning of the term, 
since the Conference had "in mind, in particular, the case of coun-
tries of immigration, where the departure of too large a proportion of 
aliens might prejudice national interests by creating manpower or 
economic problems, etc."23 The Commentary correctly, albeit in 
understatement, stated that "a great deal is thus left to the discretion 
of the belligerents, who may be inclined to interpret 'national inter-
ests' as applying to many different spheres," and exhorted states to 
show moderation by invoking national interests only in cases of 
reasons of "utmost urgency," due to "the poor conditions in which 
civilian aliens have all too often been detained."24 
The present state of international law effectively permits hostile 
belligerents to detain, at lesat for some period and possibly to detain 
or intern for the duration of a lengthy conflict, virtually every able-
bodied enemy civilian, regardless of age or sex. 
In the past, the core of state practice was to detain and intern male 
enemy civilians aged sixteen to sixty, the usual age range subject to 
military service. Quite often, children and youth below the age of 
sixteen, women in general and those of both sexes above the age of 
sixty were permitted to leave the belligerent's territory. However, 
21Civilian Convention, Art. 35 (emphasis added). 
22Pictet, supra note 8, at 236. 
23/d. (citing II-A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 
653-54, 737-38; id., II-B 410. 
24Pictet, supra note 8, at 236. 
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under an argument of minimal economic advantage to the enemy 
civilians country or of minimal economic disadvantage to the bellig-
erent in whose territory the enemy civilians are present, persons of 
both sexes from the age of twelve or thirteen to the age of seventy or 
beyond could justifiably be held by the hostile belligerent under the 
amorphous term "national interests." With such a blanket authority 
to prevent departure, the requirements of Article 35 that decision on 
applications to leave be made "as rapidly as possible" in accordance 
with "regularly established procedures", that the protected person 
may have a refusal of the application reconsidered "as soon as possi-
ble" by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by 
the Detaining Power, and that representatives of the Protecting 
Power, at its request, must be furnished "as expeditiously as possi-
ble" the names of persons denied permission to depart and the rea-
sons for denial, unless security reasons prevent it or the departed 
person concerned protests, merely ensures in most instances the 
observance of procedural niceties in exercising the virtually un-
bridled discretion of the Detaining Power to decide whom it will 
detain. One would contend that surely babies, young children, the 
very elderly, and the seriously ill or disabled have the clear right to 
leave; an argument to prevent their departure on the ground of 
national interests would be ludicrous. However, these persons are 
those in greatest need of accompaniment by at least one adult, able-
bodied family member and, if that were not permitted, then in the 
great majority of cases those persons would not leave and, in effect, 
be detained. Further, in cases where the enemy civilian has resided 
for some time in the Detaining Power's territory, that state could 
argue that, at the conflict's end, the detained persons might well 
choose to remain and seek the return of departed family members, 
potentially causing political, administrative, and economic difficul-
ties for the Detaining Power. Therefore, the Detaining Power could 
argue that the "national interests" concept would support maintain-
ing the family unit together when the principal adult members of the 
family are detained. Thus, the term "national interests" could render 
nugatory any obligation to permit enemy civilians to depart a hostile 
belligerent's territory. 
Manifestly, neither in 1949, nor over thirty years later in the 
context of modern armed conflict, does Article 35 strike anything 
approaching the proper balance between the principles of military 
necessity and of protection of enemy civilians. As Article 35 pres-
ently reads, the Detaining Power has the discretion to control enemy 
civilians far beyond that which military necessity justifies. One rec-
ognizes that, in situations of armed conflict in which a state allocates 
the overwhelming portion of its resources in support of that conflict, 
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virtually every able-bodied person, from the early teenager to the 
elderly, is in some way a potential contributor to the war effort. 
However, this scenario envisions a "total war" armed conflict situa-
tion. Enemy civilians present in a hostile belligerent's territory at 
the outbreak of conflict normally are a mere handful in comparison 
to the total population of their country. Especially in the post-World 
War II era of "limited" warfare, it is submitted that the potential 
contribution to their country's armed effort or to the economic sys-
tem of the hostile belligerent if they are detained represented by this 
group of enemy civilians is indeed negligible. In response to the 
position that certain enemy civilians may be inducted into military 
service, it is noted that, in modern armed conflict, the sheer weight of 
numbers in the field is much less important than in the past. In 
today's world of sophisticated military weaponry, it is technological 
skills and experience, especially that adaptable for military use, that 
is vital. Additionally, the number of potential military personnel 
represent€d by enemy civilians present in a hostile belligerent's 
territory at outbreak of conflict is normally extremely small in rela-
tion to their country's population. Thus, even as regards this "core" 
group of permissible detainees under past practice, it is suggested 
that modern armed conflict situations do not warrant an automatic 
blanket right of the hostile belligerent to hold these enemy civilians 
in its territory. Finally, it should be recalled that in their harsh 
restraint upon the expression of the freedom of personality, unneces-
sary detainment or internment are themselves highly deprivational. 
In the circumstances of the particular individual affected, unneces-
sary detainment or internment may lead to gravely serious physical 
and emotional suffering, even death. 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the proper balance of 
military necessity and the protection of enemy civilians requires 
major revision of Article 35 of the Civilian Convention. First, the 
provision should explicitly state the unrestricted right of all enemy 
civilians to leave a hostile belligerent's territory, if they choose, and 
then except from that blanket inclusion only the following categories 
of persons:25 enemy civilian males from sixteen to sixty years of age, 
enemy civilian males of lesser or greater age and enemy civilian 
females, to the extent that the law of the state of their nationality 
renders them liable to bear arms and participate in combat opera-
tions, and any other enemy civilian possessing such skills or informa-
25The focus in this discussion of Article 35 concerns only enemy civilians. The 
'questionof the appropriateness of providing for other protected persons is not 
addressed. 
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tion that the civilian's departure from the Detaining Power's terri-
tory would manifestly present a significant threat to the security of 
the belligerent.26 
As to the first two excepted categories, it is proposed that Article 
35 would provide further that those persons would have the right of 
departure from the Detaining Power's territory to the territory of 
the state of their nationality if their state and all of its co belligerents 
gave solemn assurance that these protected persons would not be 
accepted into their military services or permitted to serve in any 
civilian capacity with the military services and their state author-
ized the Detaining Power's Protecting Power, or Substitute for the 
Protecting Power, to determine and report that the assurances were 
effective. The one exception to the Detaining Power's duty to permit 
departure of these two categories of enemy civilians to their State of 
nationality and, likewise, the one exception to the blanket, unres-
tricted departure authorization given to the general class of enemy 
civilians, would be the particular instance in which the number of 
persons departing was so great that their addition to the opposing 
belligerent's economy manifestly would be a significant contribu-
tion. In that situation, enemy civilians in the number less than that 
manifestly constituting a significant economic contribution to the 
opposing belligerent would still be entitled to depart to their state of 
nationality, with priority to families departing as units. If the two 
requirements set forth for the departure of the first two excepted 
categories were not met, or if the exceptional situation applied, 
Article 35 would provide, finally, that those two categories of persons 
or those of the general class of enemy civilians and of these two 
categories who were prevented from departure to their state due to 
application of the exceptional situation, had the right to depart to the 
territory of a third State if a state party to the Civilian Convention 
that was a neutral in the subject conflict offered its territory as a 
place of internment for enemy civilians, whether actual administra-
tion of the internment regime was conducted by personnel of the 
neutral state or of the Protecting Power for those enemy civilians, or 
a Substitute for that Protecting Power, and that state, and any other 
state or organization participating in administration of the intern-
ment regime gave solemn assurances of the use of best efforts to 
retain these enemy civilians under the internment regime, to include 
the duty to return to the Detaining Power's control any person who 
attempted to breach the restrictions established. 
26This third category could overlap with the other two, such as in the case of a 
thirty-two year old male nuclear physicist. 
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With an eye to the "art of the possible" in any future negotiations on 
the revision of Article 35, this proposal to deal with the freedom of 
enemy civilians to depart from a hostile belligerent's own territory is 
offered for governmental and scholarly consideration. Perhaps the 
more difficult problem concerns the freedom of enemy civilians to 
depart from occupied territory controlled by a hostile belligerent. 
B. FREEDOM OF DEPARTURE FROM 
OCCUPIED TERRITORY 
For one to assume that enemy civilians present in occupied terri-
tory would prefer to remain there would be incorrect. First, some of 
that class of protected persons might be nationals of a belligerent 
state allied with the state whose territory is occupied. Those enemy 
civilians might wish to depart to the territory of their home state or 
elsewhere. They are, in effect, in much the same position as enemy 
civilians present in the hostile belligerent's own territory and the 
Civilian Convention in Article 48 incorporates Article 35 as govern-
ing their requests to depart. All of the foregoing discussion regard-
ing the freedom of enemy civilians to depart from the hostile bellig-
erent's home territory applies here with perhaps even stronger 
criticism of the use of congruence with the hostile belligerent's 
"national interests" as the standard to determine the enemy civilians' 
rights of departure. The standards establishing the rights of control 
of the Occupying Power in occupied territory are the necessities of 
preserving military security and of maintaining the Occupying 
Power's military occupation force and administrative officials and 
the duty to perform the functions of government placed upon an 
Occupying Power by the Civilian Convention and other conventional 
and customary rules of armed conflict. Whatever may be the legiti-
mate scope of "national interests" for a belligerent to consider in 
restricting the right of an enemy civilian to depart from territory 
over which the belligerent exercises full powers of sovereignty, 
assuredly the scope of "national interests" that an Occupying Power 
may apply in considering a departure request of an enemy civilian in 
occupied territory must be limited by the narrower scope of author-
ity possessed in such territory by an Occupying Power. The earlier 
proposals for modifying Article 35 apply even more trenchently in 
this situation. 
As regards the freedom of enemy civilians who are nationals of the 
state whose territory is occupied to depart from the occupied terri-
tory is only implicit under the Civilian Convention. Article 49 pro-
hibits individual or mass forcible transfers or deportation of pro-
tected persons in occupied territory, with the proviso that evacua-
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tions of a given area are permissible if the security of the population 
or imperative military reasons so demand. The Convention contains 
no provision explicitly governing the right of these persons voluntar-
ily to depart occupied territory. Pictet stated that the focus of the 
drafters of the Civilian Convention was on prohibiting future forci-
ble transfers and deportations such as those that brought death and 
misery to millions in World War 11.27 The ICRC's draft at the nego-
tiating conference absolutely prohibited deportations or transfers of 
protected persons from occupied territory.2s However, the Diplo-
matic Conference envisioned that some protected persons might 
voluntarily wish to depart: 
The Conference had particularly in mind the case of pro-
tected persons belonging to ethnic or political minorities 
who might have sufference discrimination or persecution 
on that account and might therefore wish to leave that 
country. In order to make due allowances for that legiti-
mate desire the Conference decided to authorize voluntary 
transfers by implication, and only to prohibit "forcible" 
transfer.29 
The shortcoming of this approach is that the nature of the right of 
enemy civilians to depart from the occupied territory of the state of 
their nationality is left unclear. Article 49 recognizes the freedom of 
enemy civilians to leave areas "particularly exposed to the dangers of 
war" with the limitation that the Occupying Power can prevent 
departure if "the security of the population" (dangers of significantly 
increased exposure to weaponry) or "imperative military reasons" 
(hindrance of vital military operations) so demand. However, depar-
ture from occupied territory altogether is not mentioned. The implic-
itly recognized permissibility of voluntary transfers within or out-
side occupied territory seems a weak expression of a right to depart 
occupied territory. Perhaps because these enemy civilians are 
already in the territory of their state of nationality, the drafters of the 
Civilian Convention did not think a provision explicitly recognizing 
the right of departure from that territory was essential. The view 
that very few of these enemy civilians automatically would have a 
right of entry into another state's territory may have caused reluc-
tance to speak of a right of departure from one's home territory. 
Since the Occupying Power exercises broad powers of governance 
27Pictet, supra note 8, at 278. 
28See XIII International Red Cross Conference, Draft Revised or New Conventions 
for the Protection of War Victims, Doc. 4a, at 173, quoted in Pictet, supra note 8, at 279. 
28Jd. 
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over enemy civilians present in occupied territory, the view was that 
explicitly stating a right of departure, however restricted, was inap-
propriate. The response to this series of conjectures is, first, that for 
many reasons, including past destruction and future risks of further 
armed conflict, enemy civilians may wish to depart at least tempo-
rarily from occupied territory. Secondly, their own government may 
be willing to accept them into territory it still controls, or third states 
may be prepared to accept varying numbers of these protected per-
sons, at least on a temporary basis. Thirdly, although the Occupying 
Power exercises substantial powers of governance over enemy civil-
ians in occupied territory, it is nevertheless a foreign state exercising 
the limited power of belligerent occupation, not the comprehensive, 
sovereign authority of the state of the enemy civilian's nationality. 
Thus, it is suggested that the features of the implicit departure 
right of enemy civilians who are present in occupied territory and 
are nationals of the state whose territory is occupied are that they 
have the right to depart unless prevented by "the security of the 
population," or "imperative military reasons" of the Occupying 
Power. To reduce those limitations to lesser generality, it is proposed 
that the Occupying Power is entitled to prohibit dep&rture from 
occupied territory only if the Occupying Power reasonably foresees 
unavoidable, substantially increased risks of injury to these civilians 
in the course of departure, due to the continuing armed conflict, or 
due to the hazards of a massive, rapid exodus, the departure signifi-
cantly threatens the continued ability of the Occupying Power to 
have sufficient civilian manpower authorized by the Civilian Con-
vention to support its occupation force and to perform government 
functions required if the Occupying Power under the Civilian Con-
vention and other rules of international law, or the departure were to 
provide the opposing belligerent with a significant benefit in its war 
effort. The emphasized words are to indicate that the Occupying 
Power would be under the duty to take whatever reasonable actions 
of regulation, management, and cooperation that are available to 
support the right of voluntary departure and that only significant 
adverse effect upon the interests of the Occupying Power justifies 
prevention of departure. With the incorporation of these guidelines, 
future negotiations should add an explicit provision on right of 
departure for this class of enemy civilians much along the lines of 
that proposed for modification of Article 35. The principal restraint 
would be that any great number of able-bodied adult male or female 
enemy civilians in occupied territory probably would not be entitled 
to depart. Departure of a significant percentage of those persons 
probably would significantly reduce the authorized civilian man-
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power needed by the Occupying Power. Additionally, if departure 
was to other territory of the state of their nationality, it would proba-
bly contribute a significant military or economic benefit to the oppos-
ing belligerent. As discussed under Article 35, ultimate emphasis 
would be on promoting the maximum authorized departure to neu-
tral states willing to accept enemy civilians for internment. 
IV. A FINAL PROPOSAL 
The "treaty family" of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions stands as 
one of the few examples of a series of comprehensive international 
agreements in which participation is virtually universal and which 
deal with many complex repetitive interactions in situations of vital 
international concern, such as modern armed conflicts. Such agree-
ments, however, contain no established, standing institutional agen-
cies or arrangements for on-going research, data gathering, report-
ing, and recommendations for progressive development of the law 
under the agreements. In the past, the laudable but ad hoc initiatives 
taken have been due to the exceptional interest and drive of the 
ICRC or a particularly interested state. The totality of the useful 
institutional arrangements to promote the optimal effectiveness of 
the Civilian Convention or all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is 
a subject for another time. However, the need is self-evident for 
establishing within the Conventions, and especially the Civilian 
Convention, a small Secretariat and a Commission of Experts for the 
promotion of on-going legal research, data gathering, and prepara-
tion of proposals for consideration of the parties as regards interpre-
tation and modification of the Conventions or enactment of parallel 
implementing national legislation. For the f].lture, promotion study 
and consultation on proposed modifications of substantive provi-
sions, such as those offered here, is important. However, perhaps of 
, greater long-term significance would be efforts by the ICRC and 
' interested parties to encourage consultation on creation of various 
institutional arrangements to enhance the effectiveness and pro-
gressive development of humanitarian law of armed conflict under 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. If even a modicum of success in 
advancing those objectives resulted, those efforts would have served 
"the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of 
civilization."30 
30Hague Convention, Preamble. 
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